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Abstract 
This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that 
combines features of Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981). Similar to results in Lazear 
and Rosen, as the level of noise decreases the equilibrium effort rises. As the noise variance 
approaches zero, the equilibrium effort of the shared-prize contest approaches that of a Tullock 
lottery contest. 
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1. Introduction 
A wide variety of competitions arise in economic life, and new competitions are regularly 
introduced to attract effort and reward achievement. Such competitions are commonly modeled 
as contests, in which players compete over a prize by expending costly resources. There are an 
enormous variety of possible contests (Konrad, 2009), but the three canonical models are based 
on Tullock (1980), Lazear and Rosen (1981), and Hillman and Riley (1989). 
Tullock (1980) models a probabilistic contest between two players, in which player ’s 
probability of winning is defined by a contest success function, , 
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where  and  are the efforts of players  and . The player expending the highest effort has a 
higher probability of winning, but the other player still has a chance to win. The most popular 
version of the Tullock contest is a simple lottery, in which . In this contest a unique pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium exists where players earn positive payoffs. 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) examine rank-order tournaments, in which players with greater 
achievements always win. They show that when players’ cost of effort is sufficiently convex and 
is translated into achievement with random noise, rank-order tournaments can also generate pure 
strategy Nash equilibria. Hillman and Riley (1989) study a closely related version of the Tullock 
contest, in which . This is known as a first-price all-pay auction, where the winner is 
always the player who expends the highest effort. Instead of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, in 
this contest a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists in which players choose efforts 
randomly over some interval.  
A number of studies have tried to establish common links between these three building 
blocks of contest theory. For example, Che and Gale (2000) provide a link between the rank-
order tournament of Lazear and Rosen and the all-pay auction of Hillman and Riley. They 
partially characterize the equilibrium and show that with insufficient noise no pure strategy 
equilibrium exists in the rank-order tournament. Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) show how an R&D 
race between two players that is modeled as a rank-order tournament is equivalent to a lottery 
contest for certain assumptions on the noise distribution. Baye and Hoppe (2003) identify 
conditions under which a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-
race games are strategically equivalent to the lottery contest. 
This note introduces a model of contests with random noise that combines features of 
Tullock and Lazear and Rosen. We interpret this contest as a shared-prize contest in which all 
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contestants receive a prize share that is proportional to their achievement (Long and Vousden, 
1987). This type of contest imitates some forms of competition between firms, whose marketing 
or lobbying effort may be rewarded through a share of industry profit. Shared-prize contests may 
also be used within firms to reward workers, or as a type of procurement contract to elicit effort 
among suppliers (Zheng and Vukina, 2007). 
The analytical results in this paper are restricted to the case of two symmetric players, 
and multiplicative random noise with a uniform distribution, although we also consider different 
noise distributions using numerical methods. We show that, similar to the rank-order tournament 
of Lazear and Rosen, in the shared-prize contest the equilibrium effort increases as the noise 
variance becomes smaller. Furthermore, as the noise variance approaches zero, the equilibrium 
effort with the shared prize approaches the equilibrium effort in a Tullock lottery contest.  
 
2. The Model 
Consider a simple contest in which two risk-neutral players  and  compete for a prize . 
Both players expend individual efforts  and . The output  of player  is determined by a 
production function 
,         (1) 
where  is a random variable that is drawn from the distribution . The random component , 
can be thought of as production luck or measurement error, and is not observable to either of the 
players. Player ’s probability of winning the prize is defined by a contest success function: 
.       (2) 
Every player who exerts effort  has to bear cost . The expected payoff for player  
can be written as: 
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.        (3) 
The Nash equilibrium depends on the specific conditions of the contest. 
 
2.1. Equilibria in Standard Contests  
To obtain the standard lottery contest in Tullock (1980) we set , , and 
. In this case the Nash equilibrium is unique and it is given by 
.          (4) 
For the all-pay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989), we set , , and 
. The complete characterization of the equilibrium can be found in Baye et al. (1996). In the 
all-pay auction no pure strategy equilibrium exists, unlike in the lottery contest. The mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium is characterized by the cumulative distribution function, 
  for  .        (5) 
To obtain a rank-order tournament of Lazear and Rosen (1981), we set , , 
and , . Noise in the production function and convexity of the cost function is 
necessary in order to generate a pure strategy equilibrium. When it exists, the pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium effort  can be obtained from the following expression: 
.        (6) 
The main difference between a rank-order tournament and the other two contests is the 
noise component . Once a distribution of  is specified it is easy to analyze the effect of noise 
on equilibrium effort. For example, if  is uniformly distributed on the interval –  then 
. It follows from (6) that the equilibrium effort decreases in the variance 
of the distribution. This major finding of Lazear and Rosen (1981) agrees with economic 
intuition:  it is less worthwhile to work hard when the output of the effort is noisier. 
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2.2. Equilibrium with Random Noise and a Shared Prize 
The contest we study closely resembles the Tullock lottery, with the difference that 
payoffs are deterministic and proportional to performance, subject to random noise. That is, the 
 in (2) is interpreted as the proportion of the prize value, rather than the probability of winning 
the prize. When modeling a conventional Tullock competition with risk neutral agents, adding a 
noise component would be redundant since the winner of such a contest is already chosen 
probabilistically (Fullerton and McAfee, 1999). However, in many economic competitions 
players are rewarded proportionally to some measure of performance which depends on effort 
and a random component.  
To model this type of competition, we consider a contest where all players receive a 
portion of a fixed and known prize. Such a contest arises when . This is exactly the same 
restriction as in the standard Tullock (1980) lottery contest, but now the contest success function 
is interpreted as a deterministic share of the prize. Randomness enters only through the 
production function (1). The analysis that follows assumes that , where  is a random 
variable that is drawn from the distribution  on the interval . This multiplicative noise 
production function has been used by O’Keefe et al. (1984), Hirshleifer and Riley (1992), and 
Gerchak and He (2003). A contest with this production function can also be interpreted as a 
contest where players have different, unknown abilities  (Rosen, 1986). More importantly, 
multiplicative noise implies that the contest success function (2) satisfies the axioms introduced 
by Skaperdas (1996). In particular, the contest success function satisfies the conditions of a 
probability distribution:  and , for all  and . 
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Multiplicative noise also guarantees that the contest success function is homogeneous, i.e., 
 for all . 
Given the restrictions  and , the expected payoff (3) can be rewritten as: 
.     (7) 
Taking the first order condition and assuming a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal effort 
can be obtained from the following expression: 
      (8) 
The equilibrium effort depends on the value of the prize, the convexity of the cost 
function, and the distribution of the noise. An increase in the size of the prize increases 
individual effort. However, it is not straightforward to evaluate how the equilibrium effort in (8) 
is affected by the variance of the noise distribution. If we assume the cost function is linear, 
, and that  and  are independent and uniformly distributed on the interval 
– , where  scales the variance of the distribution, then 
 .    (9) 
The expected payoff at the symmetric equilibrium (9) is positive 
,         (10) 
and the second order condition evaluated at the equilibrium is satisfied: 
    (11) 
From (9), it is straightforward to show that , i.e. as the level of noise 
increases the equilibrium effort decreases. This result is similar to the result obtained by Lazear 
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and Rosen using .
1
 The crucial difference in our model is that we model the success 
function (a share of the prize) as the Tullock lottery (r = 1).  We can solve for equilibrium as the 
variance of noise approaches to zero, by evaluating  at the limit as : 
  (12) 
With L'Hopital’s rule we can show that  as . Therefore, as the variance of 
noise approaches zero, the equilibrium of this shared-prize contest approaches the equilibrium of 
a simple lottery contest without noise (4). A smooth transition exists between this type of contest 
with a random noise and a lottery contest. There is no such transition between a rank-order 
tournament and an all-pay auction (Che and Gale, 2000). 
The assumption that the error term is uniformly distributed permits a closed form solution 
for the equilibrium effort. Our main conclusions are also robust to other noise distributions. To 
examine robustness we computed numerical solutions for three extreme cases: a (truncated) 
normal distribution, a U-shaped quadratic distribution, and the exponential distribution. We only 
restricted the mean of the distribution to equal 1. Figure 1 displays the equilibrium effort as a 
function of the distribution variance, and the two main conclusions drawn for the equilibrium 
with the uniform distribution (9) still hold. First, increases in the noise variance decrease 
equilibrium effort. Second, as the noise variance approaches zero the equilibrium efforts 
converge to a simple Tullock lottery contest without noise. 
                                                 
1
 Dasgupta and Nti (1998) and Amegashie (2006) also obtain a similar result, but in those studies the noise enters the 
contest success function as a constant term instead of a random variable.  
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Figure 1 – Equilibrium Effort as a Function of Noise Variance (V is normalized to 1)
 
 
3. Conclusions 
This note presents a contest in which agents are rewarded proportionally to their 
achievement, where this achievement depends on both effort and random noise. Our approach 
offers a structural model of contests in which a Tullock success function is linked to an explicit 
source of random noise. Similar to Lazear and Rosen, the equilibrium effort increases as the 
variance of noise decreases. As the noise variance approaches zero, it approaches the equilibrium 
effort of a Tullock lottery contest. 
Our restrictions on the production function and the distribution of noise were chosen in 
order to obtain a closed form solution for equilibrium effort. Using numerical simulations we 
demonstrate that our results are robust to three very different noise distributions, but as shown by 
Gerchak and He (2003) even in a standard rank-order tournament, changing the production 
function and the distribution of noise can significantly alter results. Therefore, a natural 
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extension of this study is to examine how the production function and the noise distribution 
affect equilibrium behavior in this type of contest. Other extensions could evaluate the effect of 
asymmetry, incomplete information, and number of players. We leave these issues for future 
research. 
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